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Abstract: The popularity of using Internet contains some risks of network attacks, 
and attack methods differ each day, thus information security problem has become a 
significant issue all over the world. Intrusion detection is one major research 
problem in network security, whose aim is to identify unusual access or attacks to 
secure internal networks. At the moment, it is an urgent need to detect, identify and 
prevent such attacks effectively. In this work, we compared efficiency of decision 
tree methods in intrusion detection system. We compared the accuracy, detection 
rate, false alarm rate for different attack types.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s business oriented world information is very important. It is even considered as an intangible asset. 
The fastest way to bring the necessary information to end users is via Internet. Internet has been so deeply 
involved in our lives in a way that we have been dependent on it. It has even been used as an important 
component of business models (Shon & Moon, 2007). The internet has been used to bring the customers and the 
businesses together by applications such as websites and emails. This brings up a very important concern, the 
information security. Intrusion detection is one of the major research topics to prevent attacks from the internet 
for both companies and the end users. Firewalls may protect the networks but day by day the attacks became 
more complicated. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) overcome this complexities providing ways to resist 
different types of suspicious network communications and computing habits. All of this is done assuming that 
the behaviour of intruders differs from an authenticated user (Stallings, 2006) (Tsai, et al. 2009). 
 
Generally IDSs divide into two main categories based on their detection methods: anomaly and misuse 
(signature) detection (Anderson, 1995) (Rhodes, Mahaffey, & Cannady, 2000). Deviation from normal operation 
can be flagged as intrusion with anomaly detection. Meanwhile the use of well-known attacks to the system can 
be caught by misuse detection (Tsai, et al. 2009). Many issues should be considered when building an IDS, like 
data collection, data pre-processing, intrusion recognition, reporting and response. The most important of these 
components is intrusion recognition (Wu, Banzhaf, 2009). 
 
In literature, since Denning first proposed the intrusion detection model in 1987 (Denning, 1987), different 
machine learning techniques are used to develop anomaly and misuse detection systems. Especially classifiers 
are used to detect whether a connection over internet is normal use or an attack (Wu, Banzhaf, 2009). Between 
late 80s and early 90s combination of expert systems and statistical methods were popular. Detection models 
have been acquired from field experts. From mid to late 90s normal abnormal detection moved to automatic 
modelling. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning helped automation via a test data. Rule based 
induction, classification and data clustering highly referenced. Since IDS have huge network traffic volumes, 
highly diverse data distribution and difficult decision boundary to construct a good model is very challenging 
(Wu, Banzhaf, 2009). In this work, we compared different decision tree methods for intrusion detection using 
KDD’99 dataset.  
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some literature review on IDS systems. Section 3 
describes the data set and performance evaluation used in this paper. Section 4 gives brief theoretical background 
for different decision tree algorithms. Section 5 gives our analysis results and we conclude in Section 6.  
 
 
2. Literature review on intrusion detection system 
 
The IDS was first mentioned in Anderson’s technical report (Anderson, 1980) where he mentioned the use of 
statistical methods to analyse users’ behaviour to detect the misuse of the system. In 1987 Dorothy laid the 
foundations of Intrusion detection models. He proposed a prototype IDS: IDES (Intrusion Detection Expert 
Systems) (Denning, 1987). After this a number of IDS has been released such as Discovery, Haysack, MIDAS, 
NADIR, NSM, Wisdom and sense, DIDS, etc (Bace, 2002). (Wu, Yen, 2009). 
 
We can classify IDSs into two major areas: Misuse Detection and Anomaly detection (Bace, 2002). In misuse 
detection we try to match incoming data with pre-defined intrusive behaviour (signature). So, the well known 
intrusions are detected very fast and accurately (low false alarm rates). For this reason this method is adopted by 
many commercial IDSs. However the intrusion methods are not trivial and will evolve continuously. If an 
unknown attack comes to the system it will fail. To overcome this shortage we have to update the signature 
database at the expense of our valuable time (Wu, Yen, 2009). 
 
The second area, anomaly detection (Denning, 1987), may overcome this problem. The anomaly detection relies 
on the fact that most of the network communications are normal data and it tries to model this normal behaviour. 
Anything off this behaviour is marked as anomaly and a flag is raised by the system. Since the intrusions are rare 
and different from the normal data this method catches most of the abnormal behaviour even with unknown 
attacks. The difficulty here is the false alarm rates. The boundary between the normal and abnormal data is often 
too close (Wu, Banzhaf, 2009). Another problem faced is the constant changing of the normal usage statistics. 
For example we see more and more UDP connections since people use video sharing sites more frequently.  
There is also a hybrid method introduced by MINDS (Ertoz et al., 2004), EMERALD, Prelude, etc. where they 
try to leverage the disadvantages of both of these methods (Wu, Yen, 2009). 
 
 
3. Datasets and performance evaluation 
 
The data we have used in the testing has been derived from well known KDD’99 datasets. This data is collected 
in 1998 by MIT Lincoln laboratory which has seven weeks of training and two weeks of test data. The test UNIX 
and Windows NT hosts and a Cisco router have faced more than 300 instances of 38 attack types.  KDD’99 
dataset is derived from this dataset in 1999 by assembling individual TCP packets into TCP connections. This 
data was the benchmark dataset used in the International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools 
competition (Tsai, et al. 2009).  
 
Each TCP connection has 41 features with a label specifying the status of the connection. The features consist of 
38 numeric and 3 symbolic features falling into one of the following categories: 
 
 1- Basic features: 9 basic features to describe each individual TCP connection. 
 2- Content features: 13 domain knowledge related feature to indicate suspicious behaviour without any 
sequential patterns.  
 3- Time-based traffic features: 9 features used to summarize the connections in the past 2 s that had the 
same destination host or the same service as the current connection. 
 4- Host-based traffic features: 10 features were constructed using a window of 100 connections to the 
same host instead of a time window to see the attacks that might take more than 2 s. (Tsai, et al. 2009). 
 
In KDD’99 dataset we have 4,940,000 data instances covering the normal and 24 network attacks. The test set 
has 311,029 data instances with a total of 38 attacks, 14 of which do not appear in the training set. Because of 
this large training set, usually another dataset with the 10% of the data is used (Wu, Banzhaf, 2009). 
The attacks contained in test information can be separated into the following categories: 
 
Probe: These are not considered as real attacks but often used as preparation steps for a full scale attack. 
They are used to investigate the end system for future attacks. 
 403 
 
Dos (Denial of service): This type of attack usually keeps server busy or uses the valuable bandwidth so that 
it will not provide the necessary service to the end users. Most common types are SYN Flooding, Ping 
Flooding and etc.  
U2R (User to Root): In this type the attacker tries to take control of the admin user of the system from the 
leaks in the system. Buffer overflow is one of these methods.  
R2L (Remote to Local): It is used to take advantage of the server providing the services in order to get 
sensitive security information on the server or user personal files. Unicode leak, SQL injection and etc. are 
examples of this attack type (Yen, Wu, 2009). 
 
In our experiments we have selected a subset of 7000 instances to train our data. This subset has 6 different kinds 
of attacks and 1 normal data. The selected attack types are considered the most widely used types which include 
"port-sweep", "back-door", "IP-sweep", "nmap atack", "satan" and "smurf".  
 
The best method to evaluate the effectiveness of an IDS is the correct prediction ability. There are four possible 
outcomes according to the real nature of a sample data compared to the outcome (prediction) from the IDS. This 
is also known as the truth matrix.  
 True negative (TN): The amount of normal data predicted when it is really normal,  
 True positive rate (TP): The amount of attack predicted when it is really attack 
 False negative rate (FN): The amount of normal predicted when it is really attack 
 False positive rate (FP): The amount of attack predicted when it is really normal. 
 TN/(TN+FP) gives specificity or False alarm rate (FAR),  
 TP/(TP+FN) gives sensitivity or detection rate (DR),  
 
The most widely used performance evaluation are Detection Rate with False Alarm Rate. A good IDS must have 
high DR and a low or zero FAR (Wu, Yen, 2009) (Wu, Banzhaf, 2009). 
 
 
4. Decision trees 
 
In this paper we have compared four different Decision Tree methods. In a decision tree we try to classify a 
sample through some decisions leading us to a succeeding decision. The classification takes places from the root 
node to the leaf where the end leaf has the category information. Each node holds one attribute of the tree and 
the branches corresponds to the value of that attribute. (Mitchell, 1997). It is pretty much similar to flow chart 
structure; the test properties are internal nodes, test results corresponds to each branches, and distribution 
situation of various types are nodes of leaves. Each decision tree will belong to one of these categories: top-down 
tree construction or bottom-up pruning. The most essential and common method used for classification tree is 
CART (Classification and Regression Trees) (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, & Stone, 1984),  ID3 and C4.5 
(Quinlan, 1993) and they are all top-down tree construction. The common algorithm can be described as such; (i) 
place all training set into the root of classification, (ii) check whether it contains all the same type or an empty 
set; if node contains more than one type of training set check each property of data according to certain function, 
and select a proper property. Divide training set into N parts, each constituting a new node to the root node 
according to the value of the property. This process is called as splitting node. (iii) Check whether each node is a 
leaf; if not, split them into new nodes as described in "ii". (iv) Proceed with splitting until each nodes turn into a 
leaf. This will construct our tree. In these methods we can totally classify any given training data into branches 
and leaves of the tree (Yen, Wu, 2009). 
 
In ID3 method, by definition, all the parameters given should be discrete values. In our sample set we have 3 
symbolic features. In order to overcome this problem we have converted these values into discrete valued 
properties with a pre-process before evaluating our sample data. Under certain conditions Decision Trees have 
advantage over other common supervised learning methods like discriminant analysis. Especially they do not 
suffer the same probability distribution restrictions. There is also no necessity to assume linear model and they 
are very useful with non-linear predictors (Wu, Banzhaf, 2009).  
 
4.1 CART 
 
In CART (Classification and Regression Trees) there are six general questions to be answered:  
 1- Should we allow properties to be restricted to binary values or let the multi valued properties exist?  
 2- Which property should be tested at a node? 
 3- When do we declare a node as a leaf 
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 4- How to make trees smaller and simpler when it becomes too large? Prune?  
 5- When we induce an impure leaf node how shall we label it?  
 6- How can we handle the missing data? 
According to these questions we create a tree giving good enough results with easy to compute and fast 
responses (Duda, Hart & Stork, 2002). 
 
4.2 ID3 
 
Since this is the third in a series of identification or "ID" process it is called ID3. The inputs were intended to be 
used with nominal (unordered) inputs only. When a real-valued variable is present it is first divided into intervals 
and then each interval applied as nominal input. Here each split has a branching factor Bj, where it is the number 
of discrete attribute container of variable j chosen for splitting. Usually these are not binary and a gain ratio 
impurity should be used. The number of levels they have is equal to the number input variables. It continues to 
run until all nodes are pure and no more possible splits exist. If necessary a common pruning technique can be 
applied to the algorithm (Duda, Hart & Stork, 2002). 
 
4.3 C4.5 
 
This is the successor and refinement of ID3 method, and very popular among classification tree methods. The 
real valued variables are handled as in CART. Nominal data is used to crate multi-way splits as in ID3 with a 
gain ratio impurity. The pruning is achieved with the statistical significance of the splits. The main difference 
between CART and C4.5 is the missing features. There are no substitute splits precomputed. If a defective test 
pattern with missing feature is present at branch N with branching factor B, C4.5 follows all possible B answers 
to the descendent nodes and at last to the B leaf nodes. The final decision is made according to the labels of B 
leaf nodes multiplied by the decision probability of N. Here, unlike CART, we don't exploit statistical 
correlations between different features of the training points. There is no extra computation and storage required 
for C4.5. So, it is much preferred where the storage is a major concern. As for the pruning, C4.5 generates the 
rules from the tree where each leaf node has one associated rule (the route from the root node to that leaf). Then 
it deletes the redundant antecedents in these rules (Duda, Hart & Stork, 2002). 
 
4.4 Random forests 
 
Decision Trees can be less accurate than methods like support vector machines and the structure of the trees can 
also be unstable (Breiman, 1996). Small changes in the training data may significantly result in changes to the 
tree, either to the identity of the split variable or to the value of the split. Even the structure changes significantly 
the resulting prediction may stay the same. RandomForest (a trademark of Saldorf Systems) algrithm is 
developed by Breiman (Breiman, 2001a,b ) to overcome these shortcomings while possibly enhancing the 
interpretability. Some of the important features of RandomForest is: (Breiman and Cutler, 2004b) 
 
- The accuracy that equals or tops many current classifiers without overfitting 
- Fast on large databases and handle thousands of predictors without selector routines 
- Each predictor importance is estimated 
- Generalization error estimate is generated in an unbiased manner 
- The missing data and error balance when a class proportion marked differently is dealt with robust algorithms.  
- The proximities between the pairs of cases that can be used in clustering and identifying outliers are computed  
- Variable interaction detection is done by an experimental method 
- Generated forest can be saved to be used on other data. 
 
The forest, generated by many trees, where each tree is different from each other at the generation of training 
cases and predictors used at each node. Each tree is generated by a subset (m) of available predictors drawn 
randomly, which is much less than the total available. This m value is the only adjustable parameter which the 
random forests are sensitive (Breiman and Cutler, 2004a). This parameter is the same for all the trees in forest. 
Each tree is allowed to grow to the most possible extend thus; there is no need for pruning. Besides increased 
prediction accuracy, they help to determine the importance of each variable and associations between each case 
(Fielding, 2007). 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
Over the past decade intrusion detection based on machine learning methods has been extensively studied topic, 
and they satisfy the growing demand of reliable and intelligent intrusion detection systems. In this study we 
compared the performance of different decision tree classifiers on solving intrusion detection problems. This 
research works were trained and tested on the KDD’99 dataset.  The classification results are shown in Table 1. 
From this table, we can easily see that there is no significant difference between accuracy of these methods; 
however, random forest is better than others. According to the average, ID3 is worst in the classification. 
Accuracy refers to the proportion of attack detected among all attack data, namely, the situation of TP. In 
detection rate, the random forest has accuracy 99.94 % approximately. False alarm rate refers to the proportion 
that normal data is falsely detected as attack behaviour, namely, the situation of FP. In comparison of false alarm 
rate, random forest is 0.1 %, but it is worse than C4.5 and CART. According to the average value, false alarm 
rate of C4.5 and CART is 0 % and better than random forest.  
 
 
Decision Tree Method Accuracy 
ID3 97.4% 
CART 99.8286 % 
C4.5 99.8857 % 
Random Forest 99.9429 % 
 
 Table 1: Classification of Different Decision Tree Algorithms 
 
We have considered the problem of comparing different decision tree classifiers, including ID3, CART, C4.5 
and random forest. Here, rather than directly comparing typical implementations of CART, ID3, C4.5 and 
random forest methods, it is more useful to consider distinctions within the different component steps. Anybody 
can build a tree using any practical feature processing, impurity measure, stopping criterion or pruning method. 
Of course, if the designer has insight into feature pre-processing, this must be utilized. Generally, pruning can be 
preferred over stopped training and cross-validation, because it takes advantage of more of the information in the 
training set. On the other hand, pruning large training sets can be computationally expensive. The pruning of 
rules is less useful for problems that have high noise and are at base statistical in nature. Similar to the most 
classification methods, one gains expertise and insight through experimentation on a wide range of problems. 
Any single tree algorithm neither dominates nor is dominated by other classification methods. It can be seen that 
trees yield classifiers with accuracy as good as other classification methods. (Duda, Hart & Stork, 2002) 
 
Even though some promising results have been accomplished by different decision tree classifier to IDSs, there 
are still challenges that lie ahead for researchers in this area. First and foremost, good benchmark datasets for 
network intrusion detection are needed. The KDD’99 is the most important benchmarks used to evaluate the 
performance of network intrusion detection systems. But, they are suffering from a serious drawback: failing to 
realistically simulate a real-world network (Brugger 2007)(Mahoney, Chan, 2003) (McHugh, 2000). An IDS 
working well on these datasets may demonstrate unacceptable performance in real environments. (Wu, Banzhaf, 
2009) 
 
These datasets possess some special characteristics, such as huge volume, high dimension and highly skewed 
data distribution. As a result, using only these datasets is not adequate to demonstrate the efficiency of a learning 
algorithm. It is also meaningful to note that the KDD’99 datasets were collected about 10 years ago. One of the 
important characteristics of intrusion detection is the capability of adaptation to continually changing 
environments. Not only the intrusive behaviour evolves continuously, but also the legitimate behaviour of users, 
systems or networks changes over time. If the IDS is not flexible enough to cope with behavioural changes, 
detection accuracy will dramatically decrease. A focus on adaptation in IDSs is highly recommended. Another 
challenge to confront in IDS is the huge volume of audit data that makes it difficult to build an effective IDS. 
Perhaps it is time to create a new and high-quality dataset for the intrusion detection task. (Wu, Banzhaf, 2009) 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Intrusion detection based on computational intelligence is currently attracting considerable interest from the 
research community. This research compares accuracy, detection rate and false alarm rate of different attacks. 
KDD’99 dataset is current benchmark dataset in intrusion detection. For comparison results of decision tree 
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algorithms, we find that Random forest is superior to others in accuracy and detection; ID3 is the worst. In 
comparison of false alarm rate, C4.5 and CART are better than Random forest. Through test and comparison, the 
accuracy and detection rate of Random forest is higher than that of others, but false alarm rate of C4.5 and 
CART is better; if we combine the two methods, overall accuracy can be increased greatly. Dataset KDD’99 
applied in the research is popularly used in current intrusion detection system; however, it is data of 1999, and 
network technology and attack methods changes greatly, it cannot reflect real network situation nowadays. 
Therefore, if newer information is got and tested and compared refresh, they can more accurately reflect current 
network situation.  
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